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The set of tools and mechanisms with which emerging-market 
countries insure themselves against volatile capital flows is in 
a state of flux. Most emerging-market countries had accumu-
lated an unprecedented level of international reserves before 
the global financial crisis that started in 2008. The crisis itself 
led to a large increase in International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
resources and the introduction of a new lending facility, the 
Flexible Credit Line (FCL). Meanwhile, some progress was 
made  toward  transforming  the  Chiang  Mai  Initiative  into 
an  Asian  Monetary  Fund,  and  the  Greek  debt  crisis  even 
prompted  calls  for  the  creation  of  a  European  Monetary 
Fund. 
Against this background, I discuss some questions that 
may  be  useful  to  have  in  mind  when  thinking  about  the 
reform  of  international  liquidity  provision  for  emerging-
market countries to deal with volatile capital flows:
n  How have emerging-market countries dealt with capital 
flow volatility in the current crisis? What was the role of 
reserves versus international crisis-lending arrangements?
n  What  is  the  appropriate  level  of  reserves  for  emerging-
market countries? At what level will their precautionary 
demand for reserves be satiated (if any)?
n  How can international crisis-lending and liquidity-provi-
sion arrangements be improved? Can such improvements 
significantly  reduce  emerging-market  countries’  demand 
for reserves?
n  Looking forward, what role can financial regulation and 
capital controls play in dealing with volatile capital flows?
EmErging-markEt CountriEs’ rEsErvEs 
and Capital Flow volatility in thE 
CurrEnt Crisis
How have emerging-market countries’ reserves been used in 
the current crisis, and were international liquidity-provision 
arrangements important to deal with capital flow volatility? 
The experience of South Korea is interesting in this regard, 
because it is a good example of an emerging-market country 
having  accumulated  a  substantial  level  of  reserves  and 
having—perhaps as a result—fared relatively well in the crisis. 
Furthermore, South Korea chairs the G-20 and has been a 
very active contributor to the debates on reforming interna-
tional financial safety nets (Lim 2010).
As shown in figure 1, South Korea entered the crisis with 
about $270 billion of foreign exchange reserves (amounting 
to approximately 30 percent of its GDP). The level of reserves 
started to decrease (and the won to depreciate) in early 2008, 
a trend that took a sharp turn for the worse after Lehman 
Brothers’ failure in September. Reserves then fell abruptly to 
about $200 billion while the currency sharply depreciated, and 
Korean banks started to encounter difficulties in rolling over 
their short-term foreign debt. It is only after Korea entered a 
$30 billion swap arrangement with the US Federal Reserve in 
October 2008 that the exchange rate and reserves stabilized. 
The Korean central bank was then able to reconstitute its stock 
of reserves (returning to the precrisis level by the end of 2009). 
The real economy was relatively spared throughout, with an 
unemployment rate that never exceeded 4 percent. 
Whereas the experience of South Korea can be used to illus-
trate the benefits of maintaining a high level of international N u m b e r   Pb1 0 - 1 8   j u l y   2 0 1 0
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reserves,1 it also highlights a double paradox. First, even countries 
with large reserves had to rely on external liquidity provision to 
restore confidence in their economies; and second, the access to 
international liquidity was provided by foreign central banks2 
rather than by the existing international crisis-lending arrange-
ments such as the IMF. This in turn raises two questions. First, 
if reserves amounting to 30 percent of GDP were not sufficient 
to avoid a confidence crisis, what level of reserves do emerging-
market countries really need? And second, how can the existing 
international crisis-lending arrangements be reformed to fulfill 
their role more effectively in a crisis?
rEsErvE adEquaCy 
Conventional rules of thumb suggest that emerging-market 
countries have accumulated an excessive amount of reserves. 
1. However, as noted by Blanchard (2009), there is little correlation between 
emerging-market countries’ precrisis level of reserves (reserves to GDP ratio in 
2007) and how countries have fared during the crisis (GDP growth between 
2008Q3 and 2009Q1). 
2. The swap with the US Federal Reserve in October 2008 was followed by a 
swap arrangement with China and an expansion of existing yen swap arrange-
ments in December 2008.
First,  international  reserves  have  become  a  large  multiple 
of  short-term  external  debt,  although  short-term  debt  is  a 
good measure of a country’s vulnerability to a sudden stop in 
capital flows. Second, many developing and emerging-market 
countries now have floating exchange rates and the fixed pegs 
that remain do not need to be sustained by a large amount 
of reserves.3 Third, the observed accumulation of reserves is 
difficult  to  explain  by  a  cost-benefit  analysis  weighing  the 
benefits of reserves in terms of crisis prevention and mitiga-
tion against the opportunity cost of not investing the reserves 
more productively (Jeanne 2007).
It  would  be  tempting  to  conclude,  on  this  basis,  that 
reserves  were  not  accumulated,  at  the  margin,  for  precau-
tionary  motives  but  for  other  reasons—e.g.,  as  a  way  of 
resisting currency appreciation and maintaining a competitive 
exchange rate. Although this view is plausible for China, it is 
not entirely convincing for countries such as Brazil, Korea, 
Mexico, or Singapore that had to rely on swap lines with the 
Federal Reserve in the crisis. But why did these countries’ 
3. For example, who would argue that China needs a large amount of 
reserves to defuse the risk of a speculative attack leading to a devaluation of its 
currency? However, it is mainly the risk of a speculative attack against a fixed 
peg, or of a run on dollar deposits, that justifies maintaining a high ratio of 




































Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics.
Figure 1     South Korea: International reserves and exchange rateN u m b e r   Pb1 0 - 1 8   j u l y   2 0 1 0
3
substantial level of reserves turn out to be insufficient in the 
fall of 2008?
The key issue in answering this question is how the reserves 
are used in a crisis. In principle, a rollover crisis in external debt 
does not require more reserves than the amount of short-term 
debt whose repayment is demanded by foreign creditors.4 This 
is the case, however, only if the reserves can be targeted to the 
domestic debtors affected by the rollover crisis at the precrisis 
exchange rate, as those debtors may become insolvent (rather 
than simply illiquid) if international liquidity is provided at 
a depreciated exchange rate. If the currency mismatches in 
domestic balances sheets5 cannot be unwound quickly at the 
precrisis exchange rate, then the authorities effectively end up 
defending an exchange rate objective and using the reserves to 
resist the depreciation of the domestic currency. 
Whether emerging-market countries used their reserves 
in the most effective manner in the fall of 2008 is an impor-
tant debate that requires further research.6 In the event, these 
countries went beyond using the reserves for the repayment 
of  short-term  external  liabilities  and  tried  to  limit  the  fall 
in the dollar price of a range of domestic assets, including 
the exchange rate. With free capital mobility, however, the 
amount of reserves required to defend the foreign currency 
price of domestic assets may be a large fraction of M2 and 
even a multiple of M2 if speculators can borrow in domestic 
currency from domestic banks (Jeanne and Wyplosz 2003). 
The lack of a clear benchmark for the appropriate level of 
precautionary reserves, and for the appropriate use of reserves, 
is a problem, both at the country level (where excessive reserve 
accumulation comes at the cost of domestic consumption or 
4. This is the rationale behind the “Greenspan-Guidotti rule” of full coverage 
of short-term external debt by reserves, which was proposed as a substitute to 
the old three-months-of-imports rule following the 1994–95 Mexican crisis.
5. The currency mismatches that matter involve primarily short-term debt, as 
the exchange rate has a good chance of having gone back to its precrisis value 
when long-term debt becomes due. 
6. One question is whether the reserves spent on foreign exchange interven-
tions could not have been used more effectively by targeting them toward the 
domestic agents indebted in foreign currency through some form of discount-
window lending.
investment) and at the global level (where it contributes to 
global financial imbalances). Absent a clear and well-accepted 
notion of how reserves should be used in a crisis, it is unlikely 
that economic research will lead to a “magic formula” for the 
optimal level of reserves that can be applied uniformly across 
countries. However, the international community could make 
more efforts to develop a normative framework for the appro-
priate  level  of  reserves  in  emerging-market  and  developing 
countries. 
In this regard, I suggest that the IMF request the member 
countries to provide a cost-benefit analysis of the appropriate 
level of reserves that are held for precautionary reasons in the 
context of its annual Article IV consultations. In the first stage 
of this process, the IMF would simply record each country’s 
analysis. In the second stage, comparing notes across countries 
and over time would hopefully lead to multilateral discipline, 
as it would be difficult for a country to change its criteria every 
year so as to justify an increasing level of reserves.
intErnational Crisis-lEnding and 
liquidity-provision arrangEmEnts
Why did Korea not rely on IMF lending in the fall of 1998? 
The  main  reason  is  that  the  US  Federal  Reserve  provided 
liquidity more expeditiously than the IMF, with little condi-
tionality or stigma effect. This raises the question of how the 
IMF can “compete” effectively with the Federal Reserve in 
providing the appropriate amount of liquidity to the appro-
priate countries and under the appropriate conditions. 
Before I turn to a discussion of this question, it is important 
to emphasize another possible reason why an intervention by the 
Federal Reserve dominated IMF lending. Having an unlimited 
capacity to create dollar liquidity, the Federal Reserve may have 
been in a much better position than the IMF to restore confi-
dence for the kind of crisis that Korea was facing. This point is 
worth emphasizing because, if what is required is true lending-
in-last-resort in a foreign currency, no other institution than the 
central bank issuing that currency can fulfill this role effectively.7
Coming  back  to  the  IMF,  its  conditionality  has  been 
streamlined, and there have been efforts to create more effec-
tive precautionary facilities since 2000, following the critiques 
against its heavy-handed intervention in the 1997–98 East 
Asian crisis. The build-up in emerging-market reserves and the 
global financial imbalances then provided another motivation 
7. The international safety nets would then need to involve the central banks 
issuing the main world currencies. For example, Truman (2008) proposed a 
multilateralization of the Federal Reserve swaps through the IMF. However, 
participating in such an arrangement may be inconsistent with central banks’ 
mandates.
The lack of a clear benchmark for the 
appropriate level of precautionary 
reserves, and for the appropriate use 
of reserves, is a problem, both at the 
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for making IMF resources more substitutable to countries’ 
own reserves. In this regard, the FCL, introduced in March 
2009, marks an important shift from ex post conditionality 
for crisis countries to ex ante conditionality for countries with 
sound fundamentals (Jeanne, Ostry, and Zettelmeyer 2008).8 
Given the way that it is structured, however, it is clear 
that one dollar of FCL is worth substantially less than one 
dollar of country’s own reserves. The FCL works as a renew-
able credit line, which at the country’s discretion can initially 
be for either a six-month period or a 12-month period with a 
review of eligibility after six months. Thus, access is guaran-
teed for a relatively short period, and future prequalification 
is neither guaranteed nor easily predictable. The criteria for 
prequalification are somewhat vague, and their future inter-
pretation by the Fund staff and Board is uncertain. 
Although it might seem desirable to make access to the 
FCL more predictable, moving in this direction involves hard 
trade-offs. Lengthening the period of prequalification creates a 
risk that countries will have access even after their policies have 
deteriorated. Another approach would be to use quantitative 
criteria à la Maastricht to prequalify countries. However, this 
approach would make it difficult to adapt the criteria to evolving 
sources of vulnerability in the global financial system and may 
lend itself to manipulation by the participating countries. Those 
trade-offs are bound to arise in any liquidity arrangement that 
seeks to make access both predictable and selective.
This being said, there is certainly scope for improving 
the FCL or for offering a richer menu of FCL-like facilities. 
First, the IMF could make its prequalification decisions more 
predictable without committing itself to rigid rules, through its 
jurisprudence. In particular, the staff reports that are released 
to explain why countries qualify for the FCL could do a better 
job of stating the general criteria behind the Fund’s decision. 
The IMF could also provide a menu including different levels 
of access to the FCL with variable premia and lending terms 
(Ostry and Zettelmeyer 2005, Ubide 2007, Blanchard 2009). 
As desirable as these improvements to the FCL seem, they 
are unlikely, in the end, to make IMF resources a very close 
8. Three countries, Mexico, Poland, and Colombia, have qualified for the 
FCL, for a total amount of $79 billion of IMF resources. They have not drawn 
on the FCL so far.
substitute to countries’ own reserves because there will always 
be hard constraints on the automaticity with which access can 
be granted. Thus, one may be forgiven for being skeptical that 
the FCL or FCL-like mechanisms will have a large impact on 
emerging-market countries’ reserve accumulation and global 
financial imbalances.
Another issue where conditionality is important is the 
future coexistence of the IMF with regional liquidity-provi-
sion arrangements such as the Chiang Mai Initiative. Crisis 
lending at the regional level is not new: In many cases (e.g., 
the 1994–95 Mexican crisis) IMF lending has been supple-
mented with regional resources. What is new is the emergence 
of regional institutions that may, in the future, provide alterna-
tives to IMF conditionality. Indeed, it is difficult not to think 
that the main purpose of those arrangements (which otherwise 
seem to have little benefits in terms of risk pooling since crises 
are more often regional than global) is to provide alternatives 
to IMF conditionality.
Reducing the IMF’s monopoly power over the definition 
of conditionality may ultimately lead to positive outcomes, 
but it also seems important to avoid inefficient coordination 
problems as we move toward a new institutional equilibrium. 
One natural first step would be a two-tier system in which 
the regional level lends up to a certain extent, which can be 
increased by IMF lending associated with more demanding 
conditionality.9 Looking forward, one could imagine moving 
toward a regime in which those roles are reversed—i.e., with 
the regional level defining conditionality and the IMF being a 
complementary source of funds. This model might make sense 
if regional conditionality is politically more acceptable than 
IMF conditionality (a notion that remains to be tested), but 
it would imply a significant reallocation of power, staff, and 
resources from the IMF to regional arrangements.
FinanCial rEgulation and Capital 
Controls
Financial  opening  in  emerging-market  countries  may  have 
benefits in decreasing the cost of equity capital and can have a 
positive effect on domestic investment. However, the economic 
gains of international financial flows seem modest for devel-
oping and emerging-market economies (Gourinchas and Jeanne 
2006). Moreover, a voluminous literature surveyed by Aizenman 
(2004) emphasizes the risks of liberalization and the vulner-
ability of emerging-market financial systems to capital mobility. 
Against  this  background,  the  conventional  wisdom  on 
9. This approach is currently adopted by the Chiang Mai Initiative, in which 
countries can access 20 percent of their quotas without IMF conditionality.
Crisis lending at the regional level is not 
new…. What is new is the emergence of 
regional institutions that may, in the future, 
provide alternatives to IMF conditionality.N u m b e r   Pb1 0 - 1 8   j u l y   2 0 1 0
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capital controls is evolving. Chile has some experience with 
prudential capital controls on inflows and some countries have 
introduced such controls in the current crisis. Recent research 
allows us to understand better the welfare case for optimal 
capital controls. For example, capital controls can mitigate 
booms  and  busts  in  capital  flows  and  asset  prices  (Jeanne 
and Korinek 2010). From this point of view, controls can be 
viewed as one component of the new macro-prudential policy 
framework  that  has  been  called  for  in  the  global  financial 
crisis. The benefits of capital controls must be weighed against 
their costs, which are many and have justified the opposition 
of the IMF to their use. This opposition is, however, softening 
(Ostry et al. 2010), which I view as a positive development. 
Looking forward, the IMF and the international community 
should play a more active role and develop with its members a 
code of good practice for prudential capital controls.
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